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RUEFENACHT, Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr contends that CA3 erred in ruling 
that the sale of 50% of a business through the transfer of stock 
'-
is the sale of a "security" within the meaning of the term in the 
~ ,_-
( . 
\ federal securities laws, and that the reality, "sale-of-
business" doctrine does not apply. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: purchased 2500 
shares of Continental Import & Export, In • for $250,000, said to 
represent 50% of the company, in reliance on financial documents 
and oral representations made by the company's president: its 
accountant: and petr, its corporate counsel. Resp promised to 
devote some time and efforts to the firm's business, including 
, 
soliciting some contracts, hiring . employees, applying for a li-
I ' 
quor license, and signing a banking resolution as an officer of 
the company so that he could sign corporate checks when the pres-
ident was unavailable. While engaging in these actions, resp 
-----remained a full-time employee · of another corporation, and all of 
his actions were subject to veto by Continental's president. 
After resp paid $120,000 of the $250,000 owed for the 
purchase price of the stock, he began to doubt the accuracy of 
representations made ·to him by the company's officers. He filed 
suit against the company, the president, the accountant, and 
petr, 
All but petr defaulted • 
..• 
granted summary judgment for petr, concluding that 
the stock purchased was not a "security" within the meaning of 
the 1933 and 1934 Acts because of the degree of resp 's control 
over the business. ~A~ reversed. Noting that there was a split 
( of authority over the test to be applied to determine whether the 
~ sale of a business through the transfer of stock ownership is a 
( 
~ 
"securit~CA3 opted to join CA2, CA4, ~AS, and , CA8 in holding 
I . ' , 
that the economic reality, "sale-of-business" doctrine employed ,------
by the DC did not app,{y , but that the court should look instead 
7 ) 
to whether the stock transferred bore the traditional incidents ) 
..... - ---- --------------/l L' 
of stock ownership. It remanded the case for trial. 
3. CONTEN1IONS: Petr acknowledges this Court's grant 
7 
of certiorari in Vista Resources v. Seagrave Corp., No. 83-1084, 
which presents ihe same basic issue. Petr argues that this case ..,_ --- ~ 
should be granted also, however, because this case involves the 
sale of only 50% of a business, while Seagrave involved the sale 
of 100% of a business, and because DC found here that resp was an 
active investor, while the investor in Seagrave was entirely pas-
, sive. Petr argues that granting cert in this case will permit a 
definitive delineation, on "the basis of these two factual dis-
tinctions, of the proper application of the economic reality 
test, if that test is adopted in Seagrave, something that will 
not be possible on the facts of Seagrave. 
Petr also argues that cert should be granted because 
~A3's decision, along , with CA9's recent decision in Landreth Tim-
ber Co. v. Landreth, (No. 83-1961, held for Seagrave), exacerbat-
ed the split among ~he circuits that already existed. 
Finally, petr con~ds that CA3's ruling conflicts with 
thi~~ourt's decisions in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. 
r' 
~ / Forman, 421 u.s. 837 (1975), and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 u.s. 
~ (1982) , which he contends mandate application of the economic 





4. DISCUSSION: This case presents the same basic issue 
as Seagrave, on what is potentially a more interesting fact pat-
tern, since the sale here involved 50% of the business. As CA3 
acknowledged, if the economic reality, "sale-of-business" doc-
~---------------~;-~---------
developed conflict, the Court will still have to resolve the 
issue. This looks like a good case to take, and a response 
should be requested. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend CFR. 
There is no response. 
September 6, 1984 Simpson Opin in petn 
lgs October 20, 1984 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: d ~L'J""·~- ~ ..... ~tv~ 
Lyn a  ,~~ 3'5-- /'f'-1 A~ 
No. 84-165 - Gould v. Ruefenacht ~.---, Re: 
This case was originally scheduled for the September 
24, 1984 Conference. Because Vista Resources v. Seagrave, No. 
83-1084, scheduled for argument this fall, was dismissed by 
motion of the parties, I recommended that we call for a response 
in this case, with an eye to granting because it presented the 
same issue as Seagrave--whether the sale of 11 or part of the - ------
stock of a business ~ the sale of a "security" within the --meaning of the federal securities laws. The Court had granted 
cert in Seagrave because of a substantial split between the 
circuits on the test to be applied. You asked me to write you a 
memo when the response came in; it is now in hand. 
Resps argue only that since Seagrave has been 
dismissed, there is no point to consolidating this case with that 
one, as petr had requested. Resps acknowledge that the question 
must be resolved, and urges that if cert is granted in Landreth 
Timber Co. v. Landreth, No. 83-1961 (a case which had also been 
held for Seagrave), cert should be granted in this case because 
the facts are sufficiently different that a decision in Landreth 
•, 
that the "economic reality" doctrine applied would not help to 
' . 
resolve this case. If, on the other hand, the Court were to 
reject the doctrine, CA3's decision in this case could be 
automatically affirmed. 
I adhere to my prior advice to grant cert in this case. 
As I noted before, this case involves the most interesting fact 
situation--sale of 50% of a business, which is neither a majority -
nor a minority, in terms of control. Resolution of this case 
could well take care of Landreth, which involves sale of 100% of 
a business. Therefore, I recommend that the Court grant cert in 
this case, and hold Landreth for it. 
Court ................... . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . 
PLEASE NOTE - FLAGGED FOR YOU 
HOLD 
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Burger, Ch. J . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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Blackmun, J ................. . 
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Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 84-165 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
~ --~ }__~.4, ~ , 
~~0--/~ ,~~~ ~~ 
To: Mr. Jus ~ ice _ Pow1Ji1~ ~March 5, 1985 
/2_~ ? 41~ s:_~ ~. J-
From: Lynda ~ 
No. 84-165 -- Gould v. Ruefenacht ~. ~ 
No. 83-1961 -- Landreth Timber Co. v. Land~ e fh ~ J 
Questions Presented 
No. 84-165 -- Whether the sale of a 50% stock 
interest in a business is a securities transaction subject 
to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws? 
No. 83-1961 -- Whether the sale of 100% of the 
stock in a business is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws? 
Because these two cases present factual variations 
on the same legal theme, I believe one bench memo can easily 
serve for both of them. You have written two of the Court's 
opinions on the question presented here: United Housing 
Foundation v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837 (1975), and Teamsters v. 
Daniel, 439 u.s. 551 (1979). Both parties in both of the 
cases at bar now rely primarily on Forman; that decision 
will be central to the resolution of both of these cases. 
For ease of discussion, I will refer to petr in 
Gould and resp in Landreth jointly as the "Sellers." I will 
refer to resp in Gould and petr in Landreth as the 
"Purchasers." 
At the outset, I should say I am inclined to agree 
with the SG that the stock involved in both cases should be 







within the meaning of the 
cases, however, are not 
dispositive; there is language in all of them supporting 
both sides of the argument. Because the stock involved here 
fits within the language of the acts, and because it bears 
all of the usual character is tics of stock, I believe that 
the securities laws should be held to apply. 
Discussion 
This Court has held generally that although the 
definition of "security" is broad, Congress did not intend 
to provide a federal remedy for all types of fraud. Marine 
Bank v. Weaver, 455 u.s. 551, 555-556 (1982). In Weaver and 
in earlier cases, therefore, the Court has begun its 
analysis by looking closely at the instrument involved to 




Forman is the case most directly relevant here. 
There, you may recall, the question was whether shares of 
stock entitl~g the purchaser to lease an apartment in New 
York's 8 Co-op City 8 were 8 Securities 8 within the meaning of 
the federal acts. The Court held that they were not because 
(i) the stock bore none of the usual characteristics of 
stock, and (ii) the transaction was not an 8 investment 
contract 8 because, looking at the economic realities of the 
transaction, the purchasers did not expect to reap profits 
derived from the entrepreneurial efforts of others. 
The Sellers rely on these statements to argue that 
the shares sold in these cases were not 8 Securities. 8 The 
Court in Forman stated that 8 [w] e reject at the outset any 
suggestion that the present transaction, evidenced by the 
sale of shares called 'stock,' must be considered a security 
transaction simply because the statutory definition of a 
security includes the words 'any stock.' 8 The Sellers 
cite this language as evidence that Forman requires the 
economic 
substance of the transactions at issue. In both cases here, 
the Sellers contend, the purchasers did not expect to reap 
profits derived from the managerial efforts of others, but 
expected to contribute substantially to management 
themselves. Thus, the Sellers contend that like the buyer 
of shares in a co-op in Forman, the purchasers here intended 
to 8 Use or consume 8 the businesses purchased, and therefore, 
., '· 
' 
the shares are not "securities" within the meaning of the 
Acts. ' . 
A careful reading of Forman shows that it does not 
so clearly mandate non-coverage by the securities laws as 
the Sellers would have us believe. Although Forman did 
decline to hold that the label "stock" is automatically 
dispositive of whether the instrument at issue is a 
"security," it also noted that 
" [ i] n holding that the name given to an 
instrument is not dispositive, we do not suggest 
that the name is wholly irrelevant to the decision 
whether it is a security. There may be occasions 
when the use of a traditional name such as 
1 stocks 1 or 1 bonds 1 will lead a purchaser 
justifiably to assume that the federal securities 
laws apply. This would clearly be the case when 
the underlying transaction embodies some of the 
significant characteristic! typically associated 
with the named instrument." 
In both of the cases here, unlike in Forman, the stock 
purchased bore all of the characteristics identified b 
Forman as earmarks of conventional stock: ( i) 
V negotiability; (ii)v--right to receive dividends contingent 
.../ 
upon an apportionment of profits; (iii) ability to be used 
as collateral; (iv)~oting rights proportional to the number 
/ 
of shares owned; and (v) share appreciation. Moreover, 
1Judge Reavley, in Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d496, 499 (CAS 
1983) , humorously interpreted this quotation from your opinion in 
this way: "No one would contend that transactions in cattle or 
consomme are "stock" transactions under the federal securities 
law, and courts must of course look beyond mere labels." 
Livestock and chicken stock, however, go beyond what even the 
Purchasers ask for in this case! 
Forman imposed no requirement that its test for determining 
whether an instrument is an "inv~stment contract" be applied 
to every type of instrument alleged to be a security. The 
Court in Forman proceeded to this test at all only after it 
had decided that the stock involved there bore none of the 
usual characteristics of stock; it did not intimate that the 
test it used should be applied to all cases in which an 
instrument was alleged to be a security. 2 
The Sellers contend that the Purchasers, because 
they intended to participate actively in the management of 
the businesses they bought, intended to "use or consume" the 
businesses, rather than reap profits "solely from the 
efforts of others," as required by Forman. It is plain, 
however, that the purchasers here did not intend to "use or I~ 
consume" the businesses in the same way that the buyers in 
Forman intended to use the co-ops. The decision in Forman 
was based on the fact that the buyers were primarily 
interested in acquiring a place to live. Furthermore, 
Forman left open whether profits must be reaped solely from 
the efforts of others, or whether a more liberal 
interpretation of that word would be allowed. 421 u.s., at 
852, n. 16. It should be remembered that in Gould, although 
2Indeed, in Teamsters v. Daniel, supra, your opinion for the 
Court referred to the economic substance test used in Forman as 
the test for "whether a particular financial arrangement 
constitutes an investment contract," 439 u.s., at 558, not as the 
all-purpose test to be used in every case involving the 
definition of "security." 
... : . ,, 
resp planned to participate in the business's management, 
the old management still retained a forceful role. 
Likewise, in Landreth, although the purchasers bought 100% 
of the business, the individuals knew nothing about the 
lumber business and kept the seller on to run it; it was 
only after the relationship began to go awry that the 
purchasers began to get involved. Thus, it is possible to 
argue that the investors in both cases here planned to reap 
profits substantially from the efforts of others. 
In sum, I do not read Forman as requiring that the 1 
Court find the stock involved here to be not covered by the 
federal securities laws. As noted above, unlike in Forman, 
the stock involved here bears all the usual indicia of 
stock, and, at least as compared to the transaction at issue 
in Forman, the transaction here more closely resembles the 
type of transaction to which the securities laws would 
apply. 
The Sellers also contend that these transactions 
should not be covered because the buyers were not the 
"passive" investors whom Congress believed needed the 
protection of the securities laws. Rather, these buyers 
were actively involved in management and well equipped to 
protect themselves. This argument ignores, however, the 
fact that at the time of purchase, these buyers were in no 
better shape than any "passive" investor to protect 
themselves against fraud or misrepresentation. It was only 
later, once they became intimately involved in the 
7. 
businesses, that the true facts were revealed. This, of 
course, is not of itself a compelling reason for applying 
the securities laws since, as you note in your memo to the 
file, state law would most likely remedy any fraud that 
occurred. In addition, I suppose the Purchasers here were 
in a better position to oversee the use of their money than 
is the usual "passive" investor. On the other hand, as CAS 
observed in Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, S04 (CAS 1983), 
there are special risks involved in the sale of stock in a 
corporation that might justify special protection. While 
one who purchases a corporation's assets is not generally 
liable for its debts and liabilities, one who acquires a 
business by purchasing its stock is, and such 1 iabil it ies 
are easily susceptible of inaccurate or incomplete 
disclosure. 
Moreover, it is true, as the SG notes, that the 
securities laws themselves refute the notion that they were 
designed to cover only "passive" investors and instruments 
traded on exchanges or over-the-counter; several provisions 
of the 1934 Act apply to transactions transferring 
controlling stock interests, and although privately 
negotiated transactions are exempted from the registration 
provisions, there are no similar exemptions from the 
antifraud provisions of the Acts. 
There are other reasons for not applying the "sale 
~
of business" doctrine. As CA2 noted in Golden v. Garafalo, 
678 F.2d 1139, 1143-1144 (CA2 1982) (Winter, J.), Supreme 
....... 
Court precedent has focused on t~ instr~me~ 
- -
at issue, in deciding what constitutes a "security." See, 
~·, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 u.s. 551 (1982); Forman; 
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 923 (1946). The application 
of the "sale of business" doctrine, on the other hand, 
depends on how much stock is sold, so that the same type of 
instrument could be a "security" in some transactions, but 
not others, or as to some parties to the transaction, but 
not others. This would lead to somewhat capricious results 
and demonstrates, as CA2 put it, that "the sale of business 
doctrine is more than an incremental extension of Forman." 
678 F.2d, at 1144. 
Moreover, the determination of whether stock is a 
"security" in these cases will depend on extensive fact-
finding as to whether control has passed and how active in 
management the purchaser becomes, inquiries that make the 
"sale of business" doctrine more than a little elusive to 
apply. Golden v. Garafalo, supra, 678 F.2d, at 1145-1146. 
But see Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 202 (CA7 1982) 
(Posner, J.) (finding it more judicially cost efficient to 
engage in line-drawing than to expand liability under the 
securities laws) . 3 
3An article in the N.Y.u. Law Review characterizes this Court's 
cases on this topic as part of a trend to restrict the reach of 
the federal securities laws. Thompson, The Shrinking Definition 
of a Security: Why Purchasing All of a Company's Stock is not a 
Federal Security Transaction, 57 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 225 (1982). He 
approves of this "trend" and urges that the Court continue it by 
Footnote continued on next page. 
In sum, given the facts that the language of the 
securities acts covers the stock involved here, and the 
stock bears the usual indicia of such instruments, I am 
inclined to think the federal acts should be held to apply. 
There is no exemption for this type of transaction from the 
antifraud provisions of the securities laws, and Forman does 
not require that the Court stretch to hold that these 
instruments are not within the definition of "security." I 
therefore recommend that you vote to affirm CA3 in Gould, 
and reverse CA9 in Landreth. 
adopting the "sale of business" doctrine. I do not agree that 
these cases are the next necessary step after the existing 
precedent. The recent cases have involved instruments or 
transactions that were, for one reason or another, substantially 
unlike what is usually thought of as a security. Forman involved 
the co-op sale, Daniel involved a non-contributory pension plan, 
and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit that was heavily 
regulated by the banking laws. Thus, that the Court found no 
securities to exist in any of these cases does not necessarily 
foretell the result here, where more traditional stock is 
involved. 
V1 
The distinguishing factor about the transactions involved here 
is that a business is purchased with the stock, so that the 
transactions~ke on some commercial, as well as investment, 
aspects. CA2 ' oted, however, in Golden v. Garafalo, supra, that 
trying to di tinguish between commercial and investment 
enterprises is both artificial and unworkable in the corporate 
world where the two are so often inseparable. 678 F.2d, at 1146. 
lgs March 7, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
J\.1\ 
Re: No. 84-165 - Gould v. Ruefenacht (CA3 - 50%) 
No. 83-1961 - Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth (CA9 - 100%) 
I just received your revised memo to the file in which 
you express an interest in knowing whether the result in these 
cases need differ depending on the amount of stock purchased. 
Because of my inclinations in these cases, contained in a bench 
memo I sent to you yesterday, I did not discuss this particular 
question in any detail. 
As I understand the "sale of business" doctrine, the 
determination whether the stock sold is a "security" in any given 
d d d . . 1 //,h h\ ') k ld b 1' t case oes epen pr1mar1 y on ow muc stoc was so , ecause 
is the major indicator of whether control of the business has 
passed. The passage of control, in turn, indicates whether the 
~---~-------~---
purchaser of the stock intended to make an "investment" through 
which he hoped to reap profits solely from the efforts of others, 
or whether he intended to engage in a commercial venture in which 
.-4 
any return on his money would come largely from his own efforts. 
Thus, in the case involving a sale of 100% of the business's 
stock, the presumption is that the stock is not "securities" 
within the meaning of the federal acts, • . In contrast, when 25% is 
sold, the presumption is that the stock is 11 securities ... 
In any of these cases, however, the question whether 
control has actually passed to the purchaser may depend on more ------th~~ht. The answer may change 
depending on how the stock and actual control of the business is 
distributed. If one purchaser bought 25%, but other stock 
holders held less than that percentage, for example, .. control .. 
might have passed. If you add to that the fact that the 
purchaser of 25% planned to run the business, the 11 Sale of 
business .. doctrine would dictate that no .. securities .. were 
involved. The Gould case presents the perennially hard question 
of line-drawing because 50% of the stock may or may not pass 
control of the business, depending on what agreement as to 
management the purchaser has with the holder of the other 50% of 
the stock, and what voting or veto rights each possesses. 
As I think I pointed out in my bench memo, even the 
Landreth case, involving a sale of 100% of the· stock, can become 
---~ .....___---..., 
complicated by the circumstances surrounding the sale. Even --though .. control .. passed with the sale of all of the lumber 
company's stock, the purchasers were not actually involved in 
management, as I understand the facts, until it became evident 
that business was not progressing as it should have. The 
purchasers there were two retirees who knew little or nothing 
about running a sawmill, and they kept the seller of the stock on 
to run the business originally. Thus, the purchasers could argue 
3 
that in fact, they intended to make an, "investment" in which they 
hoped to reap profits from the efforts of the former owner. 
The fact that application of the "sale of business" 
doctrine depends on the passage of control and how much stock was ------sold is, to my mind, a very good reason for not adopting it. It 
doesn't make much sense to me that the same stock is or is not a 
"security" depending on how much of it was sold or who bought it. 
--~ 
As I believe I pointed out in my bench memo, this Court has 
always looked first to the nature of the instrument involved to 
see whether it is a security. Only if the instrument does not 
bear the usual characteristics of a security has the Court then 
proceeded to look at the underlying economic substance of the 
transaction to see whether a security is involved. Application 
of the "sale of business" doctrine would mean that the same stock 
-- -
in the same business would most likely be a "security" if only 
~ . - -._........---,___.,__~ 
25% were sold, but would most likely not be if ffO% were sold. 
Likewise, in some circumstances it is possible that the same 
stock could be a "security" as to the seller, but not as to the 
purchaser. The result in any case would be unpredictable ex ~ 
because it would be very hard to know how a court would 
ultimately weigh the extrinsic circumstances to see whether the 
purchaser had made an "investment" or had embarked on a 
commercial venture. 
I find these cases very interesting, and acknowledge 
that there is no easy answer: as you note, there are strong 
arguments both ways. Nonetheless, I persist in my recommendation 
that you vote to affirm in Gould (CA3) 1 .and reverse in Landreth 
(CA9) • 
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No. 84-165 Gould v. Ruefenacht Conf. 3/29/85 
The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan Oj/-~ 
Justice White t:2fj M..-
'' 
Justice Marshall 
Justice Blackmun ~ ~ 
Justice Powell L::ijf--~ 
Justice Rehnquist ~ ~ 
Justice Stevens ·~ t~ 
Justice O'Connor CJ.f1 ~ 
No. 84-165 
W. GEORGE GOULD, PETITIONER, v. MAX A. RUEFENACHT, et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit 
[April __ , 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court: 
2. 
This case presents the question whether the sale of 50% 
of the stock of a company is a securities transaction 
subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws (the Acts). 
I 
In 1980, respondent purchased 2500 shares of the stock 
of Continental Import & Export, Inc., an importer of wine 
and spirits, from Joachim Birkle. Birkle was 
Continental's president and had owned 100% of the 
company's stock prior to the time of the sale. The 2500 
shares, for which respondent paid $250,000, represented 
50% of Continental's outstanding stock. 
According to respondent, he purchased the stock in 
reliance on financial documents and oral representations 
made by Birkle: Christopher O'Halloran, a certified public 
3. 
accountant; and petitioner Gould, Continental's corporate 
counsel. Part of the consideration for the deal was a 
promise by respondent that he would participate in the 
firm's management. The record reveals that he helped 
solicit contracts for the firm, participated in some 
hiring decisions, signed a banking resolution so that he 
could endorse corporate checks in Birkle 's absence, and 
engaged in other more minor pursuits. All the while, 
however, respondent remained a full-time employee of 
another corporation and his actions on behalf of 
Continental were at all times subject to Birkle's veto. 
After respondent paid $120,000 of the stock's purchase 
price, he began to doubt the accuracy of some of the 
representations made to him by Birkle and others. 
Respondent subsequently filed this suit, 1 alleging 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
4. 
violations of §§12(2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 
1933 (the 1933 Act), 15 u.s.c. §§771(2), 77q. He also 
alleged violations of §10 (b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 15 u.s.c. §78j (b), and Rule 
10(b)(5), 17 C.F.R. §240.10(b)(5). The District Court 
granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding 
that the stock respondent purchased was not a "security" 
within the meaning of §3(a) (10) of the 1934 Act, 15 u.s.c. 
§78c(a) (10), and §2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 u.s.c. §77b(l). 
Finding that respondent intended to manage Continental 
jointly with Birkle, the court concluded that the sale of 
business doctrine prevented application of the Acts. 
1The complaint named as defendants 0 1 Halloran, Birkle, 
and Continental, as well as petitioner Gould. Birkle and 
Continental have defaulted. 0 1 Halloran is listed as a 
respondent to this appeal, but filed a brief urging that 
the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed. 
s. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit reversed. 737 F.2d 320 (1984). It ruled that the 
plain language of the Acts' definitions of "security" 
included the stock at issue here, and it disagreed with 
the District Court's conclusion that the sale of business 
doctrine must be applied in every case to determine 
whether an instrument is a "security" within the meaning 
of the Acts. Because the Courts of Appeals are divided 
over the applicability of the sale of business doctrine to 
sales of stock arguably transferring control of a closely 
held business, we granted certiorari. u.s. 
(1984). For the reasons stated in our decision announced 
today in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, u.s. 
(1985) , we now affirm. 
II 
6. 
In Landreth, we held that where an instrument bears the 
label "stock" and possesses all of the character is tics 
typically associated with stock, see United Housing 
Foundation v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 851 (1975), this Court 
will not be required to look beyond the character of the 
instrument to the economic substance of the transaction to 
determine whether the stock is a "security" within the 
meaning of the Acts. The instruments respondent purchased 
were called "stock," and the District Court ruled that 
they possessed all of the characteristics listed by Forman 
that are usually associated with traditional stock. App. 
50a. As in Landreth, the context of the transaction--the 
sale of stock in a corporation--is typical of the type of 
context to which the Acts usually apply. Under these 
circumstances, we conclude that the stock is a "security" 
within the 
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the same purchaser bought small amounts of stock through 
several different transactions, it is possible that the 
Acts would apply as to some of the transactions, but not 
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make no sense in view of the Acts' purpose to protect 
investors. Moreover, the parties' inability to determine 
ex ante whether the Acts apply neither serves the Acts' 
protective purpose nor permits the purchaser to compensate 
for the added risk of no protection when negotiating the 
transaction. 
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"security,.. and that the sale of business doctrine does 
not apply. The judgment of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit is therefore 
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No. 84-165 
W. GEORGE GOULD, PETITIONER, v. MAX A. RUEFENACHT, et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit 
[April __ , 1985) 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Cour~ 
2. 
This case presents the question whether the sale of 50% 
of the stock of a company is a securities transaction 
subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws (the Acts). 
I 
In 1980, respondent purchased 2500 shares of the stock 
of Continental Import & Export, Inc., an importer of wine 
and spirits, from Joachim Birkle. Birkle was 
Continental's president and had owned 100% of the 
company's stock prior to the time of the sale. The 2500 
shares, for which respondent paid $250,000, represented 
50% of Continental's outstanding stock. 
According to respondent, he purchased the stock in 
reliance on financial documents and oral representations 
made by Birkle; Christopher O'Halloran, a certified public 
3. 
accountant; and petitioner Gould, Continental's corporate 
counsel. Part of the consideration for the deal was a 
promise by respondent that he would participate in the 
firm's management. The record reveals that he helped 
solicit contracts for the firm, participated in some 
hiring decisions, signed a banking resolution so that he 
could endorse corporate checks in Birkle 's absence, and 
engaged in other more minor pursuits. All the while, 
however, respondent remained a full-time employee of 
another corporation, and his actions on behalf of 
Continental were at all times subject to Birkle's veto. 
After respondent paid $120,000 of the stock's purchase 
price, he began to doubt the accuracy of some of the 
representations made to him by Birkle and others. 
Respondent subsequently filed this suit, 1 alleging 
4. 
violations of §§12 ( 2) and 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 
1933 (the 1933 Act), 15 u.s.c. §§771 (2), 77q. He also 
alleged violations of §10 (b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 15 u.s.c. §78j(b), and Rule 
lO(b) (5), 17 C.F.R. §240.10(b) (5). The District Court 
granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding 
that the stock respondent purchased was not a "security" 
within the meaning of §3(a) (10) of the 1934 Act, 15 u.s.c. 
§78c(a) (10), and §2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 u.s.c. §77b(l). 
Finding that respondent intended to manage Continental 
jointly with Birkle, the court concluded that the sale of 
business doctrine prevented application of the Acts. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit reversed. 737 F.2d 320 (1984). It ruled that the 
plain language of the Acts' definitions of "security" 
5. 
included the stock at issue here, and it disagreed with 
the District Court's conclusion that the sale of business 
doctrine must be applied in every case to determine 
whether an instrument is a nsecurityn within the meaning 
of the Acts. Because the Courts of Appeals are divided 
over the applicability of the sale of business doctrine to 
sales of stock arguably transferring control of a closely 
held business, we granted certiorari. u.s. 
(1984). For the reasons stated in our decision announced 
today in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, U.S. 
(1985) , we now affirm. 
II 
In Landreth, we held that where an instrument bears the 
label nstock n and possesses all of the character is tics 
typically associated with stock, see United Housing 
6. 
Foundation v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 851 (1975), this Court 
will not be required to look beyond the character of the 
instrument to the economic substance of the transaction to 
determine whether the stock is a "security" within the 
meaning of the Acts. The instruments respondent purchased 
were called "stock," and the District Court ruled that 
they possessed all of the characteristics listed by Forman 
that are usually associated with traditional stock. App. 
50a. As in Landreth, the context of the transaction--the 
sale of stock in a corporation--is typical of the kind of 
context to which the Acts usually apply. Under these 
circumstances, we conclude that the stock is a "security" 
within the meaning of the Acts, and that the sale of 
business doctrine does not apply. 
III 
7. 
Aside from the language of the Acts and the 
characteristics of the instruments, there are sound policy 
reasons for rejecting the sale of business doctrine as a 
rule of decision in cases involving the sale of 
traditional stock in a closely held corporation. As 
petitioner acknowledges, see Brief of Petitioner 27, 
application of the doctrine depends primarily in each case 
on whether control has passed to the purchaser. See, 
~, Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 203 (CA7 1982); King 
v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 345 (CAll 1982); Fredericksen v. 
Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1148 (CA7), cert denied, 451 u.s. 
1017 (1981). Control, in turn, may not be determined 
simply by ascertaining what percentage of the company's 
stock has been purchased. To be sure, in many cases, 
acquisition of more than 50% of the voting stock of a 
8. 
corporation effects a transfer of operational control. In 
other cases, however, even the ownership of more than 50% 
may not result in effective control. In still other 
cases, de facto operational control may be obtained by the 
acquisition of less than 50%. These seemingly 
inconsistent results stem from the fact that actual 
control may also depend on such variables as voting 
rights; veto rights; or any requirement for a 
supermajority vote on issues pertinent to company 
management, such as in state law or the company's 
certificate of incorporation or its by-laws. See Golden 
v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1146 (CA2 1982) ("In 'economic 
reality,' considerably less than 100%, and often less than 
50%, of outstanding shares may be a controlling block 
which, when sold to a single holder, effectively transfers 
9. 
the power to manage the business.") ; King v. Winkler, 
s~pra, at 346 (application of the sale of business 
doctrine "is not [merely] a function of numbers.") 
Whether control has passed with the stock may also depend 
on how involved in management the purchaser intends to be, 
see Landreth, supra, at Therefore, under 
respondents' theory, the Acts' applicability to a sale of 
stock such as that involved here, would rarely be certain 
at the time of the transaction. Accord, Hazen, Taking 
Stock of Stock and the Sale of Closely Held Corporations, 
61 N . C • L. Rev . 3 9 3 , 4 0 6 ( 19 8 3 ) • Rather, it would depend 
on findings of fact made by a court--often only after 
extensive discovery and litigation. 
The sale of business doctrine also would lead to 
arbitrary distinctions between transactions covered by the 
10. 
Acts and those that are not. Because application of the 
Acts would depend on factors other than the type and 
characteristics of the instrument involved, a 
corporation • s stock could be determined to be a security 
as to the seller, but not as to the purchaser, or as to 
some purchasers but not others. 2 Likewise, if the same 
purchaser bought small amounts of stock through several 
different transactions, it is possible that the Acts would 
apply as to some of the transactions, but not as to the 
one that gave him "control." See Ruefenacht v. 
O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 335 (CA3 1984). Such 
distinctions make no sense in view of the Acts' purpose to 
protect investors. Moreover, the parties • inability to 
determine ex ante whether the Acts apply neither serves 
the Acts' protective purpose nor permits the purchaser to 
11. 
compensate for the added risk of no protection when 
negotiating the transaction. 
IV 
We conclude that the stock at issue here is a 
"security," and that the sale of business doctrine does 
not apply. The judgment of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit is therefore 
Affirmed. 
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2. 
This case presents the question whether the sale of 50% 
of the stock of a company is a securities transaction 
subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws (the Acts). 
I 
In 1980, respondent purchased 2500 shares of the stock 
of Continental Import & Export, Inc., an importer of wine 
and spirits, from Joachim Birkle. Birkle was 
Continental's president and had owned 100% of the 
company's stock prior to the time of the sale. The 2500 
shares, for which respondent paid $250,000, represented 
50% of Continental's outstanding stock. 
According to respondent, he purchased the stock in 
reliance on financial documents and oral representations 
made by Birkle; Christopher O'Halloran, a certified public 
3. 
accountant; and petitioner Gould, Continental's corporate 
counsel. Part of the consideration for the deal was a 
promise by respondent that he would participate in the 
firm's management. The record reveals that he helped 
solicit contracts for the firm, participated in some 
hiring decisions, signed a banking resolution so that he 
could endorse corporate checks in Birkle 's absence, and 
engaged in other more minor pursuits. All the while, 
however, respondent remained a full-time employee of 
j another corporation> and his actions on behalf of 
Continental were at all times subject to Birkle's veto. 
After respondent paid $120,000 of the stock's purchase 
price, he began to doubt the accuracy of some of the 
representations made to him by Birkle and others. 
Respondent subsequently filed this suit, 1 alleging 
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4. 
violations of §§12(2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 
19 3 3 ( the 19 3 3 Act) , 15 U • S . C • § § 7 71 ( 2 ) , 7 7 q . He also 
alleged violations of §10 (b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 15 u.s.c. §78j (b), and Rule 
lO(b) (5), 17 C.F.R. §240.10(b) (5). The District Court 
granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding 
that the stock respondent purchased was not a "security" 
within the meaning of §3(a) (10) of the 1934 Act, 15 u.s.c. 
§78c(a) (10), and §2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 u.s.c. §77b(l). 
Finding that respondent intended to manage Continental 
jointly with Birkle, the court concluded that the sale of 
business doctrine prevented application of the Acts. 
1 The complaint named as defendants 0 1 Halloran, Birkle, 
and Continental, as well as petitioner Gould. Birkle and 
Continental have defaulted. 0 1 Halloran is listed as a 
respondent to this appeal, but filed a brief urging that 
the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed. 
5. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit reversed. 737 F.2d 320 (1984). It ruled that the 
plain language of the Acts' definitions of "security" 
included the stock at issue here, and it disagreed with 
the District Court's conclusion that the sale of business 
doctrine must be applied in every case to determine 
whether an instrument is a "security" within the meaning 
of the Acts. Because the Courts of Appeals are divided 
over the applicability of the sale of business doctrine to 
sales of stock arguably transferring control of a closely 
held business, we granted certiorari. u.s. 
(1984). For the reasons stated in our decision announced 
today in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, U.S. 
(1985), we now affirm. 
II 
6. 
In Landreth, we held that where an instrument bears the 
label "stock" and possesses all of the character is tics 
typically associated with stock, see United Housing 
Foundation v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 851 (1975), this Court 
will not be required to look beyond the character of the 
instrument to the economic substance of the transaction to 
determine whether the stock is a "security" within the 
meaning of the Acts. The instruments respondent purchased 
were called "stock," and the District Court ruled that 
they possessed all of the characteristics listed by Forman 
that are usually associated with traditional stock. App. 
50a. As in Landreth, the context of the transaction--the 
sale of stock in a corporation--is typical of the~f 
context to which the Acts usually apply. Under these 
circumstances, we conclude that the stock is a "security" 
7. 
within the meaning of the Acts, and that the sale of 
business doctrine does not apply. 
III 
Aside from the language of the Acts and the 
characteristics of the instruments, there are sound policy 
reasons for rejecting the sale of business doctrine as a 
rule of decision in cases involving the sale of 
traditional stock in a closely held corporation. As 
petitioner acknowledges, see Brief of Petitioner 27, 
application of the doctrine depends primarily in each case 
on whether control has passed to the purchaser. See, 
~' Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 203 (CA7 1982); King 
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1017 (1981). Control, in turn, may not be determined 
8. 
simply by ascertaining what percentage of the company's 
stock has been purchased. To be sure, in many cases, 
acquisition of more than 50% of the voting stock of a 
corporation effects a transfer of operational control. In 
other cases, however, de facto operational control may be 
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block which, when sold to a single holder, effectively 
transfers the power to manage the business."); King v. 
Winkler, supra, at 346 (application of the sale of 
business doctrine "is not [merely] a function of 
numbers.") Whether control has passed with the stock may 
also depend on how involved in management the purchaser 
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and characteristics of the instrument involved, a 
corporation's stock could be determined to be a security 
as to the seller, but not as to the purchaser, or as to 
some purchasers but not others. 2 Likewise, if the same 
purchaser bought small amounts of stock through several 
different transactions, it is possible that the Acts would 
example, although the sale of all of a 
ation's stock to a single buyer by a single seller 
likely not constitute the sale of a security under 
octrine as to either party, the same sale to a single 
buyer by several sellers, none of whom exercised control, 
c.::,'(~.,.. ~t-~w:f§~Nl be considered to be a securities transaction as to 
t sellers, but not as to the buyer. See Ruefenacht v. 
'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 335 & n. 36 (CA3 1984): McGrath 
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 467-468 n.5 (CA7), 
cert denied, 454 u.s. 835 (1981): Seldin, When Stock is 
Not a Security, 37 Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). 
11. 
apply as to some of the transactions, but not as to the 
one that gave him "control." See Ruefenacht v. 
O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 335 (CA3 1984) 0 Such 
distinctions make no sense in view of the Acts' purpose to 
protect investors. Moreover, the parties' inability to 
determine ex ante whether the Acts apply neither serves 
the Acts' protective purpose nor permits the purchaser to 
compensate for the added risk of no protection when 
negotiating the transaction. 
IV 
We conclude that the stock at issue here is a 
"security," and that the sale of business doctrine does 
not apply. The judgment of the United States Court of 




TO: Lynda DATE: April 22, 1985 
FROM: Lewis F. · Powell, Jr. 
84-165 Gould v. Ruefenacht 
Your draft of April 20 is on target. My only 
substantive suggestion is that we take a further look at 
Part III: the discussion of the inapplicability of the 
business doctrine. In the margin on page 7, I inquire 
whether the application of the "doctrine" depends solely 
on "control". You refer to petitioner's "acknowledging" 
this. I would cite to the acknowledgement, and to cases 
that have so held. 
I suggest some revision of part of Part III 
along the following lines: 
2. 
"There are sound reasons, other than the 
language of the ~e Acts and the characteristics of the 
security, for rejecting the business doctrine as a rule of 
decision in cases involving the sale of traditional stock 
in a closely held corporation. As petitioner 
acknowledges, application of this doctrine depends 
primarily in each case on whether 
To be sure, in many cases acquisition of more 
than 50% of the ~ voting stock of a corporation effects 
a transfer of operational control. In other cases, 
however, de facto operational control may be acquired by 
~(9~~ 
the acquisition of less than 50% . &r even the ownership of 
1\ 
more than 50% ~~ ~f-~r ~ ~~ 
lgs April 20, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: Our Securities Cases Opinions 
Enclosed is a copy of the 1st Chambers Draft in 
Landreth, as well as my first draft of Gould. As you will see, I 
have marked some corrections on Landreth and have changed Part IV 
slightly to conform to my draft in Gould. I have attached a new 
insert for Part IV of Landreth, as well. 
If you think that these two cases should be combined 
into one O£~ion, I think it can be done. While I 
fine to do two separate opinions, Gould will be rather short. 








From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: ----------
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st CHAMBERS DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-165 
W. GEORGE GOULD, PETITIONER v. MAX A. 
RUEFENACHT ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the sale of 50% of 
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the 
Acts). 
I 
In 1980, respondent purchased 2500 shares of the stock of 
Continental Import & Export, Inc., an importer of wine and 
spirits, from Joachim Birkle. Birkle was Continental's pres-
ident and had owned 100% of the company's stock prior to 
the time of the sale. The 2500 shares, for which respondent 
paid $250,000, represented 50% of Continental's outstanding 
stock. 
According to respondent, he purchased the stock in reli-
ance on financial documents and oral representations made 
by Birkle; Christopher O'Halloran, a certified public account-
ant; and petitioner Gould, Continental's corporate counsel. 
Part of the consideration for the deal was a promise by re-
spondent that he would participate in the firm's management. 
The record reveals that he helped solicit contracts for the 
firm, participated in some hiring decisions, signed a banking 
resolution so that he could endorse corporate checks in 
Birkle's absence, and engaged in other more minor pursuits. 
















2 GOULD v. RUEFENACHT 
ployee of another corporation, and his actions on behalf of 
Continental were at all times subject to Birkle's veto. 
Mter respondent paid $120,000 of the stock's purchase 
price, he began to doubt the accuracy of some of the repre-
sentations made to him by Birkle and others. Respondent 
subsequently filed this suit, 1 alleging violations of §§ 12(2) 
and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act), 15 
U. S. C. §§ 771(2), 77q. He also alleged violations of§ 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 15 
U.S. C. §78j(b), and Rule 10(b)(5), 17 CFR §240.10(b)(5). 
The District Court granted summary judgment for the de-
fendants, concluding that the stock respondent purchased 
was not a "security" within the meaning of § 3(a)(10) of the 
1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c(a)(10), and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 
15 U. S. C. § 77b(l). Finding that respondent intended to 
manage Continental jointly with Birkle, the court concluded 
that the sale of business doctrine prevented application of the 
Acts. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed. 737 F. 2d 320 (1984). It ruled that the plain lan-
guage of the Acts' definitions of "security" included the stock 
at issue here, and it disagreed with the District Court's con-
clusion that the sale of business doctrine must be applied in 
every case to determine whether an instrument is a "secu-
rity" within the meaning of the Acts. Because the Courts of 
Appeals are divided over the applicability of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine to sales of stock arguably transferring control 
of a closely held business, we granted certiorari. -- U. S. 
-- (1984). For the reasons stated in our decision an-
nounced today in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, --
U. S. -- (1985), we now affirm. 
1 The complaint named as defendants O'Halloran, Birkle, and Co=-~­
tal, as well as petitioner Gould. Birkle and Continental have efaulted. 
O'Halloran is listed as a respondent to this appeal, but filed a brie g 






In Landreth, we held that where an instrument bears the 
label "stock" and possesses all of the characteristics typically 
associated with stock, see United Housing Foundation v. 
Forman, 4211U. S. 837, 851 (1975), this Court will not be re-
quired to look beyond the character of the instrument to the 




the stock is a "~ecurity" within the meaning of the Acts. The · ~ 
instruments re~pondent purchased were called "stock," and -,!-
the District Court ruled that they possessed all of the charac- ~ 
teristics listed~ Forman that are usually associated with ~-- ~~ .:.r ~ 
traditional stock. App. 50a. As in Landreth, t~ntext ow - rr-r ~-, 
~he sale of~ in a corporati!)!!r-iS typical ~ ~  
of the kind of (Mitext to which the Acts 1iffi.i8H~ aftilyf' ~;? L. ...~.. /._ ~ 
-~~~-ID~~·:r:cu~o.taJ~~ ~ conclude that the stock is a 7~/ • 
"security" within the meaning of the Acts, and that the 'sal~ VJ~~ ___ L _... __ . 
1 of business doctrine does not apply. / ___......-~~ 
-4~AJ III 
Aside from the language of the Acts and the characteristics 
of the instruments, there are sound policy reasons for reject-
ing the sale of business doctrine as a rule of decision in cases 
involving the sale of traditional stock in a closely held cor-
poration. As petitioner acknowledges, see Brief of Peti-
tioner 27, application of the doctrine depends primarily in 
each case on whether control has passed to the purchaser. 
See, e. g., Sutter v. Groen, 687 F. 2d 197, 203 (CA7 1982); 
King v. Winkler, 673 F. 2d 342, 345 (CAll 1982); Frederick-
sen v. Poloway, 637 F. 2d 1147, 1148 (CA7), cert denied, 451 
U. S. 1017 (1981). Control, in turn, may not be determined 
simply by ascertaining what percentage of the company's 
stock has been purchased. To be sure, in many cases, acqui-
sition of more than 50% of the voting stock of a corporation 
effects a transfer of operational control. In other cases, 
however, even the ownership of more than 50% may not re-
sult in effective control. In still other cases, de facto opera-
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tional control may be obtained by the acquisition of less than 
50%. These seemingly inconsistent results stem from the 
fact that actual control may also depend on such variables as 
voting rights; veto rights; or~ requiremen~ .> 
majority vote on issues pertinent to company management, 
uc as state law or the company's certificate of incorpora-
tion or its by-laws. See Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 
1146 (CA2 1982) ("In 'economic reality,' considerably less 
than 100%, and often less than 50%, of outstanding shares 
may be a controlling block which, when sold to a single 
holder, effectively transfers the power to manage the busi-
ness."); King v. Winkler, supra, at 346 (application of the 
sale of business doctrine "is not [merely] a function of num-
bers.") Whether control has passed with the stock may also 
depend on how involved in management the purchaser in-
tends to be, see Landreth, supra, at--. Therefore, under 
respondents' theory, the Acts' applicability to a sale of stock 
such as that involved here, would rarely be certain at the 
time of the transaction. Accord, Hazen, Taking Stock of 
Stock and the Sale of Closely Held Corporations, 61 N. C. L. 
Rev. 393, 406 (1983). Rather, it would depend on findings of 
fact made by a court-often only after extensive discovery 
and litigation. 
The sale of business doctrine also would lead to arbitrary 
distinctions between transactions covered by the Acts and 
those that are not. Because application of the Acts would 
depend on factors other than the type and characteristics of 
the instrument involved, a corporation's stock could be deter-
mined to be a security as to the seller, but not as to the pur-
chaser, or as to some purchasers but not others. 2 Likewise, 
2 For example, although the sale of all of a corporation's stock to a single 
buyer by a single seller would likely not constitute the sale of a security 
under the sale of business doctrine as to either party, the same sale to a 
single buyer by several sellers, none of whom exercised control, would 
probably be considered to be a securities transaction as to the sellers, but 
not as to the buyer. See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F. 2d 320, 335, 
84-165-0PINION 
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if the same purchaser bought small amounts of stock through 
several different transactions, it is possible that the Acts 
would apply as to some of the transactions, but not as to the 
one that gave him "control." See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 
737 F. 2d 320, 335 (CA3 1984). Such distinctions make~ ~ 
sense in view of the Acts' purpose to protect investors. 
Moreover, the parties' inability to determine ex ante whether { ~ _ 
the Acts apply neither serves the Acts' protective purpose 
nor permits the purchaser to compensate for the added risk 
of no protection when negotiating the transaction. ~ -..... 
·~~ IV 
We conclude that the stock at issue here is a "security," 
and that the sale of business doctrine does not apply. The 
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit is therefore 
Affirmed. 
and n. 36 (CA3 1984); McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F. 2d 458, 
467-468, n. 5 (CA7), cert denied, 454 U. S. 835 (1981); Seldin, When Stock 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-165 
W. GEORGE GOULD, PETITIONER v. MAX A. 
RUEFENACHT ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the sale of 50% of 
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the 
Acts). 
I 
In 1980, respondent purchased 2500 shares of the stock of 
Continental Import & Export, Inc., an importer of wine and 
spirits, from Joachim Birkle. Birkle was Continental's pres-
ident and had owned 100% of the company's stock prior to 
the time of the sale. The 2500 shares, for which respondent 
paid $250,000, represented 50% of Continental's outstanding 
stock. 
According to respondent, he purchased the stock in reli-
ance on financial documents and oral representations made 
by Birkle; Christopher O'Halloran, a certified public account-
ant; and petitioner Gould, Continental's corporate counsel. 
Part of the consideration for the deal was a promise by re-
spondent that he would participate in the firm's management. 
The record reveals that he helped solicit contracts for the 
firm, participated in some hiring decisions, signed a banking 
resolution so that he could endorse corporate checks in 
Birkle's absence, and engaged in other more minor pursuits. 
All the while, however, respondent remained a full-time em-
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ployee of another corporation, and his actions on behalf of 
Continental were at all times subject to Birkle's veto. 
After respondent paid $120,000 of the stock's purchase 
price, he began to doubt the accuracy of some of the repre-
sentations made to him by Birkle and others. Respondent 
subsequently filed this suit, 1 alleging violations of §§ 12(2) 
and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act), 15 
U. S. C. §§ 771(2), 77q. He also alleged violations of§ 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 15 
U. S. C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10(b)(5), 17 CFR § 240.10(b)(5). 
The District Court granted summary judgment for the de-
fendants, concluding that the stock respondent purchased 
was not a "security'' within the meaning of § 3(a)(10) of the 
1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c(a)(10), and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 
15 U. S. C. § 77b(1). Finding that respondent intended to 
manage Continental jointly with Birkle, the court concluded 
that the sale of business doctrine prevented application of the 
Acts. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed. 737 F. 2d 320 (1984). It ruled that the plain lan-
guage of the Acts' definitions of "security" included the stock 
at issue here, and it disagreed with the District Court's con-
clusion that the sale of business doctrine must be applied in 
every case to determine whether an instrument is a "secu-
rity" within the meaning of the Acts. Because the Courts of 
Appeals are divided over the applicability of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine to sales of stock arguably transferring control 
of a closely held business, we granted certiorari. -- U. S. 
-- (1984). For the reasons stated in our decision an-
nounced today in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, --
U.S.- (1985), we now affirm. 
' The complaint named as defendants O'Halloran, Birkle, and Contine~( +, 
tal, as well as petitioner Gould. Birkle and Continental ~ defaulte ~ u.r.t- 0 11 Pfi"M · 
O'Halloran is listed as a respondent to this appeal, but filed a brief urging 





In Landreth, we held that where an instrument bears the 
label "stock" and possesses all of the characteristics typically 
associated with stock, see United Housing Foundation v. 
Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 851 (1975), this 4:e~ will not be re-
quired to look beyond the character of the instrument to the 
economic substance of the transaction to determine whether 
the stock is a "security'' within the meaning of the Acts. The 
instruments respondent purchased were called "stock," and 
C\ coUA.t 
the District Court ruled that they possessed all of the charac-
teristics listed by Forman that are usuall associated with we. nc:J€t:l 
traditional stock. App. 50a. As in Landreth, t.fie QQRteKt ef .L-
the tFaRsaetien-jthe sale of stock m a corporation~s typical £ ~ t-..e r-M.S 
of the kind of eefi~nfi. to which the Acts QSYAll~ apply. ll__ !?-~~~---­
Unrler the~e eit ettm~tanee~&S ~e conclude that the stock 1s a ~d 1e t.ts 
"security" within the meaning of the Acts, and that the sale pu:resp~ 
of business doctrine does not apply. 
III 
Aside from the language of the Acts and the characteristics 
of the instruments, there are sound policy reasons for reject-
ing the sale of business doctrine as a rule of decision in cases 
involving the sale of traditional stock in a closely hel~ \ 
poration. As petitioner acknowledges, see Brief ~~i- ~
tioner 27, application of the doctrine depends primarily in 
each case on whether control has passed to the purchaser. 
See, e. g. , Sutter v. Groen, 687 F. 2d 197, 203 (CA7 1982); 
King v. Winkler, 673 F. 2d 342, 345 (CAll 1982); Frederick-
sen v. Poloway, 637 F. 2d 1147, 1148 (CA7), ce emed, 451 
U. S. 1017 (1981). Control, in turn, may not be determined 
simply by ascertaining what percentage of the company's 
stock has been purchased. To be sure, in many cases, acqui-
sition of more than 50% of the voting stock of a corporation 
effects a transfer of operational control. In other cases, 
however, even the ownership of more than 50% may notre-
sult in effective control. In still other cases, de facto opera-
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tional control may be obtained by the acquisition of less than 
50%. These seemingly inconsistent results stem from the 
fact that actual control may also depend on such variables as 
voting rights; veto rights; or ~ requirement or a super-
majority vote on issues pertinent to company management, 
such as state law or the company's certificate of incorpora-
tion or its by-laws. See Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 
1146 (CA2 1982) ("In 'economic reality,' considerably less 
than 100%, and often less than 50%, of outstanding shares 
may be a controlling block which, when sold to a single 
holder, effectively transfers the power to manage the busi-
ness."); King v. Winkler, supra, at 346 (application of the 
~;. sale of business doctrine "is not [merely] a function of num-
J' ~ 0 ber~') r Whether control has passed with the stock may also 
~ dep~d on how involved in management the purchaser in-
tends to be, see Landreth, supra, at--. Therefore, under 
q....- respondents' theory, the Acts' applicability to a sale of stock 
/ such as that involved heret would rarely be certain at the 
time of the transaction. Accord, Hazen, Taking Stock of 
Stock and the Sale of Closely Held Corporations, 61 N. C. L. 
Rev. 393, 406 (1983). Rather, it would depend on findings of 
fact made by a court-often only after extensive discovery 
_____ ....., and litigation. 
Abica j;~ ~ )1...----Jthe sale of business doctrine also would lead to arbitrary 
r ' _ ~ distinctions between transactions covered by the Acts and 
those that are not. Because applica · of the cts woul 
depend on factors other than the type and characteristics of 
the instrument involved, a corporation's stock could be deter-
mined to be a security as to the seller, but not as to the pur-
chaser, or as to some purchasers but not others. 2 Likewise, 
2 For example, although the sale of all of a corporation's stock to a single 
buyer by a single seller would likely not constitute the sale of a security 
under the sale of business doctrine as to either party, the same sale to a 
single buyer by several sellers, none of whom exercised control, would 
probably be considered to be a securities transaction as to the sellers, but 




if the same purchaser bought small amounts of stock through 
several different transactions, it is possible that the Acts 
would apply as to some of the transactions, but not as to the 
one that gave him "control." See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, n .. :u ..... L 
737 F. 2d 320, 335 (CA3 1984). Such distinctions make ~~--~ 
sense in view of the Acts' purpose to protect investors. 
Moreover, the parties' inability to determine ~xfi!i&, whether o..t- -fA-e. -l-ime of~ 
the Acts apply neither serves the Acts' protective purpose ~Cf-lOY\ 
nor permits the purchaser to compensate for the added risk 
of no protection when negotiating the transaction. 
IV 
We conclude that the stock at issue here is a "security," 
and that the sale of business doctrine does not apply. The 
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit is therefore 
Affirmed. 
and n. CA3 1984); McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F . 2d 458, 
467-468, n. 5 (CA7), ce denied, 454 U. S. 835 (1981); Seldin, When Stock 
is Not a Security, 37 Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). 
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From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-165 
W. GEORGE GOULD, PETITIONER v. MAX A. 
RUEFENACHT ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the sale of 50% of 
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the 
Acts). 
I 
In 1980, respondent purchased 2500 shares of the stock of 
Continental Import & Export, Inc., an importer of wine and 
spirits, from Joachim Birkle. Birkle was Continental's pres-
ident and had owned 100% of the company's stock prior to 
the time of the sale. The 2500 shares, for which respondent 
paid $250,000, represented 50% of Continental's outstanding 
stock. 
According to respondent, he purchased the stock in reli-
ance on financial documents and oral representations made 
by Birkle; Christopher O'Halloran, a certified public account-
ant; and petitioner Gould, Continental's corporate counsel. 
Part of the consideration for the deal was a promise by re-
spondent that he would participate in the firm's management. 
The record reveals that he helped solicit contracts for the 
firm, participated in some hiring decisions, signed a banking 
resolution so that he could endorse corporate checks in 
Birkle's absence, and engaged in other more minor pursuits. 
All the while, however, respondent remained a full-time em-
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ployee of another corporation, and his actions on behalf of 
Continental were at all times subject to Birkle's veto. 
Mter respondent paid $120,000 of the stock's purchase 
price, he began to doubt the accuracy of some of the repre-
sentations made to him by Birkle and others. Respondent 
subsequently filed this suit, 1 alleging violations of §§ 12(2) 
and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act), 15 
U. S. C. §§ 771(2), 77q. He also alleged violations of§ 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 15 
U. S. C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10(b)(5), 17 CFR § 240.10(b)(5). 
The District Court granted summary judgment for the de-
fendants, concluding that the stock respondent purchased 
was not a "security" within the meaning of § 3(a)(10) of the 
1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c(a)(10), and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 
15 U. S. C. § 77b(1). Finding that respondent intended to 
manage Continental jointly with Birkle, the court concluded 
that the sale of business doctrine prevented application of the 
Acts. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed. 737 F. 2d 320 (1984). It ruled that the plain lan-
guage of the Acts' definitions of "security" included the stock 
at issue here, and it disagreed with the District Court's con-
clusion that the sale of business doctrine must be applied in 
every case to determine whether an instrument is a "secu-
rity" within the meaning of the Acts. Because the Courts of 
Appeals are divided over the applicability of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine to sales of stock arguably transferring control 
of a closely held business, we granted certiorari. -- U. S. 
-- (1984). For the reasons stated in our decision an-
nounced today in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, --
U. S. -- (1985), we now affirm. 
1 The complaint named as defendants O'Halloran, Birkle, and Continen-
tal, as well as petitioner Gould. Birkle and Continental have defaulted. 
O'Halloran is listed as a respondent to this appeal, but filed a brief urging 




In Landreth, we held that where an instrument bears the 
label "stock" and possesses all of the characteristics typically 
associated with stock, see United Housing Foundation v. 
Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 851 (1975), this Court will not be re-
quired to look beyond the character of the instrument to the 
economic substance of the transaction to determine whether 
the stock is a "security" within the meaning of the Acts. The 
instruments respondent purchased were called "stock," and 
the District Court ruled that they possessed all of the charac-
teristics listed by Forman that are usually associated with 
traditional stock. App. 50a. As in Landreth, the context of 
the transaction-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical 
of the kind of context to which the Acts usually apply. 
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the stock is a 
"security" within the meaning of the Acts, and that the sale 
of business doctrine does not apply. 
III 
Aside from the language of the Acts and the characteristics 
of the instruments, there are sound policy reasons for reject-
ing the sale of business doctrine as a rule of decision in cases 
involving the sale of traditional stock in a closely held cor-
poration. As petitioner acknowledges, see Brief of Peti-
tioner 27, application of the doctrine depends primarily in 
each case on whether control has passed to the purchaser. 
See, e. g., Sutter v. Groen, 687 F. 2d 197, 203 (CA7 1982); 
King v. Winkler, 673 F. 2d 342, 345 (CA111982); Frederick-
sen v. Poloway, 637 F. 2d 1147, 1148 (CA7), cert denied, 451 
U. S. 1017 (1981). Control, in turn, may not be determined 
simply by ascertaining what percentage of the company's 
stock has been purchased. To be sure, in many cases, acqui-
sition of more than 50% of the voting stock of a corporation 
effects a transfer of operational control. In other cases, 
however, even the ownership of more than 50% may not re-




tional control may be obtained by the acquisition of less than 
50%. These seemingly inconsistent results stem from the 
fact that actual control may also depend on such variables as 
voting rights; veto rights; or any requirement for a super-
majority vote on issues pertinent to company management, 
such as in state law or the company's certificate of incorpora-
tion or its by-laws. See Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 
1146 (CA2 1982) ("In 'economic reality,' considerably less 
than 100%, and often less than 50%, of outstanding shares 
may be a controlling block which, when sold to a single 
holder, effectively transfers the power to manage the busi-
ness."); King v. Winkler, supra, at 346 (application of the 
sale of business doctrine "is not [merely] a function of num-
bers.") Whether control has passed with the stock may also 
depend on how involved in management the purchaser in-
tends to be, see Landreth, supra, at--. Therefore, under 
respondents' theory, the Acts' applicability to a sale of stock 
such as that involved here, would rarely be certain at the 
time of the transaction. Accord, Hazen, Taking Stock of 
Stock and the Sale of Closely Held Corporations, 61 N. C. L. 
Rev. 393, 406 (1983). Rather, it would depend on findings of 
fact made by a court-often only after extensive discovery 
and litigation. 
The sale of business doctrine also would lead to arbitrary 
distinctions between transactions covered by the Acts and 
those that are not. Because application of the Acts would 
depend on factors other than the type and characteristics of 
the instrument involved, a corporation's stock could be deter-
mined to be a security as to the seller, but not as to the pur-
chaser, or as to some purchasers but not others. 2 Likewise, 
2 For example, although the sale of all of a corporation's stock to a single 
buyer by a single seller would likely not constitute the sale of a security 
under the sale of business doctrine as to either party, the same sale to a 
single buyer by several sellers, none of whom exercised control, would 
probably be considered to be a securities transaction as to the sellers, but 
not as to the buyer. See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F. 2d 320, 335, 
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if the same purchaser bought small amounts of stock through 
several different transactions, it is possible that the Acts 
would apply as to some of the transactions, but not as to the 
one that gave him "control." See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 
737 F. 2d 320, 335 (CA3 1984). Such distinctions make no 
sense in view of the Acts' purpose to protect investors. 
Moreover, the parties' inability to determine ex ante whether 
the Acts apply neither serves the Acts' protective purpose 
nor permits the purchaser to compensate for the added risk 
of no protection when negotiating the transaction. 
IV 
We conclude that the stock at issue here is a "security," 
and that the sale of business doctrine does not apply. The 
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit is therefore 
Affirmed. 
and n. 36 (CA3 1984); McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F. 2d 458, 
467-468, n. 5 (CA7), cert denied, 454 U. S. 835 (1981); Seldin, When Stock 
is Not a Security, 37 Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-165 
. 
W. GEORGE GOULD, PETITIONER v. MAX A. 
RUEFENACHT ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1985) 
JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the sale of 50% of 
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the 
Acts). 
I 
In 1980, respondent purchased 2500 shares of the stock of 
Continental Import & Export, Inc., an importer of wine and 
spirits, from Joachim Birkle. Birkle was Continental's pres-
ident and had oWned 100% of the company's stock prior to 
the time of the sale. The 2500 shares, for which respondent 
paid $250,000, represented 50% of Continental's outstanding 
stock. 
According to respondent, he purchased the stock in reli-
ance on financial documents and oral representations made 
by Birkle; Christopher O'Halloran, a certified public account-
ant; and petitioner Gould, Continental's corporate counsel. 
Part of the consideration for the deal was a promise by re-
spondent that he would participate in the firm's management. 
The record reveals that he helped solicit contracts for the 
firm, participated in some hiring decisions, signed a banking 
resolution so that he could endorse corporate checks in 
Birkle's absence, and engaged in other more minor pursuits. 
All the while, however, respondent remained a full-time em-
·-. 
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ployee of another corporation, and his actions on behalf of 
Continental were at all times subject to Birkle's veto. 
After respondent paid $120,000 of the stock's purchase 
price, he began to doubt the accuracy of some of the repre-
sentations made to him by Birkle and others. Respondent 
subsequently filed this suit, 1 alleging violations of §§ 12(2) 
and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act), 15 
U. S. C. §§ 771(2), 77q. He also alleged violations of§ 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 15 
U. S. C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10(b)(5), 17 CFR § 240.10(b)(5). 
The District Court granted summary judgment for the de-
fendants, concluding that the stock respondent purchased 
was not a "security'' within the meaning of § 3(a)(10) of the 
1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c(a)(10), and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 
15 U. S. C. § 77b(1). Finding that respondent intended to 
manage Continental jointly with Birkle, the court concluded 
that the sale of business doctrine prevented application of the 
Acts. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed. 737 F. 2d 320 (1984). It ruled that the plain lan-
guage of the Acts' definitions of "security'' included the stock 
at issue here, and it disagreed with the District Court's con-
clusion that the sale of business doctrine must be applied in 
every case to determine whether an instrument is a "secu-
rity'' within the meaning of the Acts. Because the Courts of 
Appeals are divided over the applicability of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine to sales of stock arguably transferring control 
of a closely held business, we granted certiorari. -- U. S. 
-- (1984). For the reasons stated in our decision an-
nounced today in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, --
U. S. - (1985), we now affirm. 
1 The complaint named as defendants O'Halloran, Birkle, and Continen-
tal, as well as petitioner Gould. Birkle and Continental defaulted for fail-
ure to appear. O'Halloran is listed as a respondent to this appeal, but filed 
a brief urging that the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed. 
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II 
In Landreth, we held that where an instrument bears the 
label "stock" and possesses all of the characteristics typically 
associated with stock, see United Housing Foundation v. 
Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 851 (1975), a court will not be re-
quired to look beyond the character of the instrument to the 
economic substance of the transaction to determine whether 
the stock is a "security" within the meaning of the Acts. The 
instruments respondent purchased were called "stock," and 
the District Court ruled that they possessed all of the charac-
teristics listed by Forman that are usually associated with 
traditional stock. App. 50a. As we noted in Landreth,~ 
sale of stock in a corporation is typical of the kind of tdac-
tion to which the Acts by their terms apply. We conclude 
that the stock purchased by respondent is a "security'' within 
the meaning of the Acts, and that the sale of business doc-
trine does not apply. 
III 
Aside from the language of the Acts and the characteristics 
of the instruments, there are sound policy reasons for reject-
ing the sale of business doctrine as a rule of decision in cases 
involving the sale of traditional stock in a closely held cor-
poration. As petitioner acknowledges, see Brief for Peti-
tioner 27, application of the doctrine depends primarily in 
each case on whether control has passed to the purchaser. 
See, e. g., Sutter v. Groen, 687 F. 2d 197, 203 (CA7 1982); 
King v. Winkler, 673 F. 2d 342, 345 (CA111982); Frederick-
sen v. Poloway, 637 F. 2d 1147, 1148 (CA7), cert. denied, 451 
U. S. 1017 (1981). Control, in turn, may not be determined 
simply by ascertaining what percentage of the company's 
stock has been purchased. To be sure, in many cases, acqui-
sition of more than 50% of the voting stock of a corporation 
effects a transfer of operational control. In other cases, 
however, even the ownership of more thim 50% may notre-
sult in effective control. In still other cases, de facto opera-
tional control may be obtained by the acquisition of less than 
84-16&--0PINION 
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50%. These seemingly inconsistent results stem from the 
fact that actual control may also depend on such variables as 
voting rights; veto rights; or requirements for a super-
majority vote on· issues pertinent to company management, 
such as may be required by state law or the company's certifi-
cate of incorporation or its by-laws. See Golden v. 
Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1146 (CA2 1982) ("In 'economic re-
ality,' considerably less than 100%, and often less than 50%, 
of outstanding shares may be a controlling block vrhich, when 
sold to a single holder, effectively transfers the power to 
manage the business."); King v. Winkler, aupra, at 346 
(application of the sale of business doctrine ''is not [merely] a 
function of numbers"). Whether control has passed with the 
stock may also depend on how involved in management the 
purchaser intends to be, see Landreth, supra, at --. 
Therefore, under respondents' theory, the Acts' applicability 
to a sale of stock such as that involved here would rarely be 
certain at the time of the transaction. Accord, Hazen, Tak-
ing Stock of Stock and the Sale of Closely Held Corporations, 
61 N. C. L. Rev. 393, 406 (1983). Rather, it would depend 
on findings of fact made by a court-often only after exten-
sive discovery and litigation. 
Application of the sale of business doctrine also would lead 
to arbitrary distinctions between transactions covered by the 
Acts and those that are not. Because applicability of the 
Acts would depend on factors other than the type and charac-
teristics of the instrument involved, a corporation's stock 
could be determined to be a security as to the seller, but not 
as to the purchaser, or as to some purchasers but not others. 1 
1 For example, although the sale of all of a corporation's stock to a single 
buyer by a single seller would likely not constitute the sale of a security 
under the sale of business doctrine as to either party, the same sale to a 
single buyer by several sellers, none of whom exercised control, would 
probably be considered to be a securities transaction as to the sellers, but 
not as to the buyer. See R1Uj'mo.cht v. O'Hallomn. 737 F. 2d 320, 335, 
and n. 36 (CA3 1984); McGrath v. Zenith .Radio Corp., 651 F. 2d 458, 
. . : 
84-165-0PINION 
GOULD v. RUEFENACHT 5 
Likewise, if the same purchaser bought small amounts of 
stock through several different transactions, it is possible 
that the Acts would apply as to some of the transactions, but 
not as to the one that gave him "control." See Ruefenacht v. 
O'Halloran, 737 F. 2d 320, 335 (CA3 1984). Such distinc-
tions make little sense in view of the Acts' purpose to protect 
investors. Moreover, the parties' inability to determine at 
the time of the transaction whether the Acts apply neither 
serves the Acts' protective purpose nor permits the pur-
chaser to compensate for the added risk of no protection 
when negotiating the transaction. 
IV 
We conclude that the stock at issue here is a "security," 
and that the sale of business doctrine does not apply. The 
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit is therefore 
Affirmed. 
467-468, n. 5 (CA7), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 835 (1981); Seldin, When Stock 
is Not a Security, 37 Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). 
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This case presents the question whether the sale of 50% of 
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the 
Acts). 
I 
In 1986, respondent purchased~ shares of the stock of 
Continental Import & Export, InC, an importer of wine and 
spirits, from Joachim Birkle. Birkle was Continental's pres-
ident and had oWl1ed 100% of the company's stock prior to 
the time of the sale. The 2500 shares, for which respondent 
paid $250,000, represented to% of Continental's outstanding 
stock. 
According to respondent, he purchased the stock in reli-
ance on financial documents and oral representations made 
by Birkle; Christopher O'Halloran, a certified public account-
ant; and petitioner Gould, Continental's corporate counsel. 
Part of the consideration for the deal was a promise by re-
spondent that he would participate in the firm's management. 
The record reveals that he helped solicit contracts for the 
firm, participated in some hiring decisions, signed a banking 
resolution so that he could endorse corporate checks in 
Birkle's absence, and engaged in other more minor pursuits. 
All the while, however, respondent remained a full-time em-
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ployee of another corporation, and his actions on behalf of 
Continental were at all times subject to Birkle's veto. 
After respondent paid $120,000 of the stock's purchase 
price, he began to doubt the accuracy of some of the repre-
sentations made to him by Birkle and others. Respondent 
subsequently filed this suit, 1 alleging violations of §§ 12(2) / 
and 17(a) 'Of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act), 15 , 
U.S. C. §§77~.(2), 77q . .------ He also alleged violations of§ 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 15/ ~SE£ STYU 
U.S. C. §78j(b),/ and Rule 10(b)(5); 17 CFR §240.10(b)(5)~ ( 19<6~) QL:::: MANUM I 
The District Court granted summary judgment for the de- ~ ~.l~r 
fendants, concluding that the stock respondent purchased 
was not a "security'' within the meaning of § 3(a)(10) '(;f the 
1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c(a)(l0); and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 
15 U. S. C. § 77b(1). Findmg that respondent intended to 
manage Continental jointly with Birkle, the court concluded 
that the sale of business doctrine prevented application of the 
Acts. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed. 737 F. 2d 320 (1984). / It ruled that the plain lan-
guage of the Acts' definitions of "security'' included the stock 
at issue here, and it disait'eed with the District Court's con-
clusion that the sale of business doctrine must be applied in 
every case to determine whether an instrument is a "secu-
rity'' within the meaning of the Acts. Because the Courts of 
Appeals are divided over the applicability of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine to sales of stock arguably transferring control 
of a closely held business, we granted certiorari. --4- U. S. If"'"/ 
-- (1984). For the reasons stated in our decision an- / 
nounced today in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, L___ _ _,. ~ f J' -1 
. S. -- (1 , we now affirm. 
1 The complaint named as defendants O'Halloran, Birkle, and Continen-
tal, as well as petitioner Gould. Birkle and Continental defaulted for fail-
ure to appear. O'Halloran is listed as a respondent to this appeal, but tiled 
a brief urging that the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed. 
: 
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II 
In Landreth, we held that where an instrument bears the 
label "stock" and possesses all of the characteristics typically 
associated with stock, see United Housing Foundation v. 
Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 851 (1975), ' a court will not be re-
quired to look beyond the character of the instrument to the 
economic substance of the transaction to determine whether 
the stock is a "security" within the meaning of the Acts. The 
instruments respondent purchased were called "stock," and 
the District Court ruled that they possessed all of the charac-
teristics listed by Forman that are usually associated with 
traditional stock. App. 50a. "' As we noted in Landreth, (the 
sale of stock in a corporation is typical of the kind of tdac-
tion to which the Acts by their terms apply. We conclude 
that the stock purchased by respondent is a "security" within 
the meaning of the Acts, and that the sale of business doc-
trine does not apply. 
III 
Aside from the language of the Acts and the characteristics 
of the instruments, there are sound policy reasons for reject-
ing the sale of business doctrine as a rule of decision in cases 
involving the sale of traditional stock in a closely held cor-
poration. - As petitioner acknowledges, see Brief for Peti-
tioner 27 ;ipplication of the doctrine depends primarily in 
each case on whether control has passed to the purchaser . ..----~ 
See, e. g., Sutter v. Groen, 687 F. 2d 197, 203 ~7 1982); 
King v. Winkler, 673 F. 2d ~, 345 (CAll ~82); Frederiqk- 10) a 
sen v. Poloway, 637 F. 2d 1147, 1148 (CA7), cert. denied, 451 
U. S. 1017 (1981).""" Control, in turn, may not be determined 
simply by ascertaining what percentage of the company's 
stock has been purchased. To be sure, in many cases, acqui-
sition of more than 50% of the voting stock of a corporation 
effects a transfer of operational control. In other cases, SEt mu 
however, even the ownership of more than 50% may notre- , , 1\//.7 "=: IAttiAL 
suit in effective control. In still other cases, de facto opera- ..J.1:Q:X ~ 1 ft Cl 
tiona! control may be obtained by the acquisition of less than · c -
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50%. These seemingly inconsistent results stem from the 
fact that actual control may also depend on such variables as 
voting rightsr/ veto rightS6) or requirements for a super-
majority vote on· issues pertinent to company management, 
such as may be required by state law or the company's certifi-
cate of incorporation or its by-laws. .---- See Golden v. 
Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1146 (CA2 1982) ("In 'economic re-
ality,' considerably less than 100%, and often less than 50%, 
of outstanding shares may be a controlling block which, when 
sold to a single holder, effectively transfers the power to 
manage the business.");Kirzg v. Winkler, BUpra, at 346 ,.-
(application of the sale of business doctrine ''is not [merely] a 
function of numbers"). ,.......Whether control has passed with the 
stock may also depend on how involved in management the 
purchaser intends to be, see Landreth, 8, at --. 
Therefore, under respondents' theory, the Acts applicability 
to a sale of stock such as that involved here would rarely be 
certain at the time of the transaction. Accord, Hazen, Tak-
ing Stock of Stock and the Sale of Closely Held Corporations, 
61 N. C. L. Rev. 393, 406 (1983). / Rather, it would depend 
on findings of fact made by a court~ften only after exten-
sive discovery and litigation. 
Application of the sale of business doctrine also would lead 
to arbitrary distinctions between transactions covered by the 
Acts and those that are not. Because applicability of the 
Acts would depend on factors other than the type and charac-
teristics of the instrument involved, a corporation's stock 
could be determined to be a security as to the seller, but not 
as to the purchaser, or as to some purchasers but not others. 1 
1 For example, although the sale of all of a corporation's stock to a single 
buyer by a single seller would likely not constitute the sale of a security 
under the sale of business doctrine as to either party, the same iale to a 
single buyer by several sellers, none of whom exercised control, would 
probably be considered to be a securities transaction as to the sellers, but 
not as to the buyer. See Ru4'e714Cht v. O'Hallamn. 737 F. 2d 320, 835, 
and n. 86 (CA3 1984)( McGmth v. Zenith Radio Corp .• 651 F. 2d 458, / 
' 
o.nfe 11 f -;
. . . . 
84-165--0PINION 
GOULD~RUEFENACHT 5 
Likewise, if the same purchaser bought small amounts of 
stock through several different transactions, it is possible 
that the Acts would apply as to some of the transactions, but 
not as to the one that gave him "control." See Ruefenacht v. j 
O'Halloran, 737 F. 2d ~ 335((CA3 1984}) Such distinc- 1 o.::t d 
tions make little sense in view of the Acts' purpose to protect 
investors. Moreover, the parties' inability to detennine at 
the time of the transaction whether the Acts apply neither 
serves the Acts' protective purpose nor permits the pur-
chaser to compensate for the added risk of no protection 
when negotiating the transaction. 
IV 
We conclude that the stock at issue here is a "security," 
and that the sale of business doctrine does not apply. The 
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit is therefore 
Affirmed. 
/ / 
467-468, n. 5 (CA7), eert. denied, 454 U. S. 835 (1981); Seldin, When Stock 
is Not a Security, 37 Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982) . ...--
1The complaint named as defendants 0' Halloran, Birkle, 
and Continental, as well as petitioner Gould. Birkle and 
Continental have defaulted. O'Halloran is listed as a 
respondent to this appeal, but filed a brief urging that 
the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed. 
2For example, although the sale of all of a corporation's 
stock to a single buyer by a single seller would likely 
not constitute the sale of a security under the sale of 
business doctrine as to either party, the same sale to a 
single buyer by several sellers, none of whom exercised 
control, would probably be considered to be a securities 
transaction as to the sellers, but not as to the buyer. 
See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 335 & n. 36 
(CA3 1984); McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 
467-468 n.5 (CA7), cert denied, 454 u.s. 835 (1981); 
Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security, 37 Bus. Law. 637, 
679 (1982). 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-165 
W. GEORGE GOULD, PETITIONER v. MAX A. 
RUEFENACHT ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the sale of 50% of 
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the 
Acts). 
I 
In 1980, respondent purchased 2,500 shares of the stock of 
Continental Import & Export, Inc., an importer of wine and 
spirits, from Joachim Birkle. Birkle was Continental's pres-
ident and had owned 100% of the company's stock prior to 
the time of the sale. The 2,500 shares, for which respondent 
paid $250,000, represented 50% of Continental's outstanding 
stock. 
According to respondent, he purchased the stock in reli-
ance on financial documents and oral representations made 
by Birkle; Christopher O'Halloran, a certified public account-
ant; and petitioner Gould, Continental's corporate counsel. 
Part of the consideration for the deal was a promise by re-
spondent that he would participate in the finn's management. 
The record reveals that he helped solicit contracts for the 
finn, participated in some hiring decisions, signed a banking 
resolution so that he could endorse corporate checks in 
Birkle's absence, and engaged in other more minor pursuits. 
All the while, however, respondent remained a full-time em-
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ployee of another corporation, and his actions on behalf of 
Continental were at all times subject to Birkle's veto. 
After respondent paid $120,000 of the stock's purchase 
price, he began to doubt the accuracy of some of the repre-
sentations made to him by Birkle and others. Respondent 
subsequently filed this suit, 1 alleging violations of §§ 12(2) 
and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act), 15 
U. S. C. §§ 77l(2), 77q. He also alleged violations of§ lO(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 15 
U. S. C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10(b)(5), 17 CFR § 240.10(b)(5) 
(1984). The District Court granted summary judgment for 
the defendants, concluding that the stock respondent pur-
chased was not a "security" within the meaning of § 3(a)(10) 
ofthe 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C. §78c(a)(10), and §2(1) of the 1933 
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b(l). Finding that respondent intended 
to manage Continental jointly with Birkle, the court con-
cluded that the sale of business doctrine prevented applica-
tion of the Acts. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed. 737 F. 2d 320 (1984). It ruled that the plain lan-
guage of the Acts' definitions of "security'' included the stock 
at issue here, and it disagreed with the District Court's con-
clusion that the sale of business doctrine must be applied in 
every case to determine whether an instrument is a "secu-
rity'' within the meaning of the Acts. Because the Courts of 
Appeals are divided over the applicability of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine to sales of stock arguably transferring control 
of a closely held business, we granted certiorari. 469 U. S. 
-- (1984). For the reasons stated in our decision an-
nounced today in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, ante, 
p. --, we now affinn. 
1 The complaint named as defendants O'Halloran, Birkle, and Continen-
tal, as well as petitioner Gould. Birkle and Continental defaulted for fail-
ure to appear. O'Halloran is listed as a respondent to this appeal, but filed 
a brief urging that the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed. 
' . 
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II 
In Landreth, we held that where an instrument bears the 
label "stock" and possesses all of the characteristics typically 
associated with stock, see United Housing Foundation v. 
Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 851 (1975), a court will not be re-
quired to look beyond the character of the instrument to the 
economic substance of the transaction to determine whether 
the stock is a "security'' within the meaning of the Acts. The 
instruments respondent purchased were called "stock," and 
the District Court ruled that they possessed all of the charac-
teristics listed by Forman that are usually associated with 
traditional stock. App. 50a. As we noted in Landreth, 
ante, at --, the sale of stock in a corporation is typical of 
the kind of transaction to which the Acts by their terms 
apply. We conclude that the stock purchased by respondent 
is a "security'' within the meaning of the Acts, and that the 
sale of business doctrine does not apply. 
III 
Aside from the language of the Acts and the characteristics 
of the instruments, there are sound polic~ reasons for reject-
ing the sale of business doctrine as aniie of decision in cases 
involving the sale of traditional stock in a closely held cor-
poration. As petitioner acknowledges, see Brief for Peti-
tioner 27, application of the doctrine depends primarily in 
'- ' each case on whether control has passeo to the purchaser. 
See, e. g., Sutter v. Groen, 687 F. 2d 197, 203 (CA7 1982); 
King v. Winkler, 673 F. 2d 342, 345 (CA111982); Frederik-
sen v. Poloway, 637 F. 2d 1147, 1148 (CA7), cert. denied, 451 
U. S. 1017 (1981). Control, in turn, may not be determined 
simply by ascertaining what percentage of the company's 
stock has been purchased. To be sure, in many cases, acqui-
sition of more than 50% of the voting stock of a corporation 
effects a transfer of operational control. In other cases, 
however, even the ownership of more than 50% may not re-
sult in effective control. In still other cases, de facto opera-
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tiona! control may be obtained by the acquisition of less than 
50%. These seemingly inconsistent results stem from the 
fact that actual control may also depend on such variables as 
voting rights, ·veto rights, or requirements for a super-
majority vote on issues pertinent to company management, 
such as may be required by state law or the company's certifi-
cate of incorporation or its by-laws. See Golden v. 
Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1146 (CA2 1982) ("In 'economic re-
ality,' considerably less than 100%, and often less than 50%, 
of outstanding shares may be a controlling block which, when 
sold to a single holder, effectively transfers the power to 
manage the business."); King v. Winkler, supra, at 346 
(application of the sale of business doctrine "is not [merely] a 
function of numbers"). Whether control has passed with the 
stock may also depend on how involved in management the 
purchaser intends to be, see Landreth, ante, at --. 
Therefore, under respondents' theory, the Acts' applicability 
to a sale of stock such as that involved here would rarely be 
certain at the time of the transaction. Accord, Hazen, Tak-
ing Stock of Stock and the Sale of Closely Held Corporations, 
61 N. C. L. Rev. 393, 406 (1983). Rather, it would depend 
on findings of fact made by a court-often only after exten-
sive discovery and litigation. 
Application of the sale of business doctrine also would lead 
to arbitrary distinctions between transactions covered by the 
Acts and those that are not. Because applicability of the 
Acts would depend on factors other than the type and charac-
teristics of the instrument involved, a corporation's stock 
could be detennined to be a security as to the seller, but not 
as to the purchaser, or as to some purchasers but not others. 2 
1 For example, although the sale of all of a corporation's stock to a single 
buyer by a single seller would likely not constitute the sale of a security 
under the sale of business doctrine as to either party, the same sale to a 
single buyer by several sellers, none of whom exercised control, would 
probably be considered to be a securities transaction as to the sellers, but 
not as to the buyer. See RuefeMCht v. O'Halloran, 737 F. 2d 320, 335, 
' . 
84-165-0PINION 
GOULD v. RUEFENACHT 5 
Likewise, if the same purchaser bought small amounts of 
stock through several different transactions, it is possible 
that the Acts would apply as to some of the transactions, but 
not as to the one that gave him "control." See Ruefenacht v. 
O'Halloran, 737 F. 2d, at 335. Such distinctions make little 
sense in view of the Acts' purpose to protect investors. 
Moreover, the parties' inability to detennine at the time of 
the transaction whether the Acts apply neither serves the 
Acts' protective purpose nor pennits the purchaser to com-
pensate for the added risk of no protection when negotiating 
the transaction. 
IV 
We conclude that the stock at issue here is a "security," 
and that the sale of business doctrine does not apply. The 
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit is therefore 
Affirmed. 
and n. 36 (CA3 1984); McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F. 2d 458, 
467-468, n. 5 (CA7), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 835 (1981); Seldin, When Stock 
is Not a Security, 37 Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). 
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This is a similar case. It is here on writ of 
certiorari to the Ufti~d S~-es Court of Appeals for the Third -
Circuit. It presents the question whether the sale of ~% of the 
common stock of a company~is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. In 
light of our opinion in La~eth Timber Co. v. Landreth, ;'and f~ ~~ --- ~ ___.., :~ 
the reasons stated in an opinion filed with the Clerk today,/ we 
1\ ~ . 
agree with the Court of Appeals that the ~~of this stock~ 
such a transaction. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore 
affirmed. 
JUSTICE STEVENS filed a dissenting opinion. 
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